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Abstract 
In this paper we explore processes related to the externalization of EU rules 
and norms in the ENP framework in relation to Ukraine. Using empirical data 
gathered from studying official documents and interviews with governmental 
officials, academics, journalists and NGO activists in Ukraine, we analyse the 
externalization of EU rules in Ukraine along the four dimensions proposed by 
Rieker (2014): scope of agreements, level of adaptation, level of participation 
and level of attraction. In each of these areas, we study the dynamics of 
externalization in the three policy fields of energy, trade and visa issues. The 
dynamics in these dimensions have implications for how the EU is perceived 
in Ukraine. Processes of externalizing and adapting to EU rules are highly 
contingent upon the dynamics emanating from the local ‘social structures’ and 
the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the governance order in the  countries of the EU 
neighbourhood, in this case Ukraine. The fast paced developments in Ukraine 
following the decision not to sign the Association Agreement in October 2013 
and the large scale civil unrest that ensued in the months that followed 
resulting in the ousting of president Yanukovich from power in February 
2014, further underline the need to pay close attention to locally generated 
dynamics in societies neighbouring the EU when assessing the EU’s ability to 
extend its security community beyond its borders.* 
Keywords: European Neighbourhood Policy, Ukraine, social structure, 
absorptive capacity, externalization of EU governance, security community 
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 Introduction 
In this paper we explore the processes related to the externalization of 
EU rules and norms in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
framework in relation to Ukraine. In line with the analytical framework 
proposed by Rieker (2014), we see institutional approximation towards 
the EU standards, rules and procedures as conceptually linked up to 
building a security community. Our empirical research indicates that 
local social structures mediate adaptation to new sets of rules, that 
various kinds of inefficiencies arise, and that some rules in certain 
sectors are implemented more swiftly than in others. Political 
developments since October 2013, when Ukraine decided against 
signing the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) and large scale 
civil unrest in the first months of 2014, underline the need to take the 
pre-existing social and institutional context into consideration when 
studying the EU’s ability to function as an effective developer of its 
security community beyond its borders. 
Most studies of the externalization of EU governance have focused 
on the EU side of the process, with less attention to the dynamics of 
adaptation in the countries on the receiving end (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig 2009, but see Lavenex 2004, 
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). Using an organization theory 
based institutionalist approach, we examine the processes of 
adaptation on the ground in Ukraine, and show that there are various 
kinds of locally conditioned dynamics and degrees of adaptation and 
standardization in different policy fields. The approach shows that in 
addition to studying the level of integration of neighbouring countries 
into the EU’s political and economic order at the macro-level focusing 
on the numbers and kinds of EU-laws adopted etc., there is a need to 
study local dynamics at the micro-level which lead to various kinds of 
inefficiencies in the processes of rule adoption in the neighboring 
countries.  
By shifting the focus from the EU side towards the actual dynamics 
on the ground in the neighboring countries, we bridge a gap in the 
literature. Processes of externalizing EU rules are highly contingent 
upon the absorptive capacity of the target countries. Basically, we 
argue that the extent of such absorptive capacity depends on local 
social structures that are responsible for transfer of the EU rule and for 
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adapting national legislation to that of the EU. Using empirical data1 
we analyse the level of integration of Ukraine along the three 
dimensions proposed by Rieker (2014): scope of agreements, level of 
adaptation, level of participation and level of attractiveness. In each of 
these areas, we examine the dynamics of externalization in three 
important policy fields: energy, trade and visa issues.2 The dynamics in 
these dimensions have implications for the level of attractiveness of the 
EU in Ukraine. 
                                                          
1  Authors conducted interviews in Kiev from 24th September to 3rd October 2013 with 
governmental officials, academics, journalists and NGO activists in Ukraine 
additional data was gathered by the study of official documents and newspapers. 
2  S Energy cooperation and visa-dialogue are often seen as  “breakthrough sectors of 
EU-Ukraine cooperation” (Duleba et al., 2012:5, see also Popescu and Wilson 
2009). Hence, we decided to study progress in these areas. In addition, at the core 
of the Association Agreement is the DCFTA covering all trade-related areas and 
further deepens Ukraine´s access to the European market and encourage further 
European investment in Ukraine (Europa, 2013).Therefore we focus on exploring 
the dynamics of rule externalization in Ukraine in these three policy fields which 
have been central to EU-Ukraine relations 
 Security community building 
beyond EU borders and the 
dynamics of local social structures 
in the EU’s neighbourhood 
Our starting point is that the EU can be conceptualized as a security 
community along the lines presented by Deutsch (1957) and later Adler 
and Barnett (1998). To get an analytical grip on the processes of 
externalizing EU governance and on the process of security community 
building in the EU's neighbourhood, it is useful to think of this as a 
process of standardization towards sets of rules, structures and 
procedures common in the EU. To study processes of externalization of 
EU rules in its neighbourhood, we employ the framework developed by 
Rieker (2014) including four dimensions: scope of agreements, level of 
adaptation, level of participation and level of attraction. Rieker defines 
the scope of agreements as policy fields covered by jointly agreed legal 
documents between the EU and the neighbouring countries, and the  
specific kinds of EU legislation adopted into the legal system of the 
neighboring countries. The level of adaptation as relates to institutional 
factors that mediate the degree to which EU rules and regulations are 
adapted in countries seeking closer ties with the Union. The level of 
participation denotes the extent to which a country devotes resources 
(human, economic, technical) for participation in various kinds of EU 
policy domains. It also refers to the degree to which there is broad 
consensus, at the elite level as well as in society more generally, as to 
feelings of belonging to a specific security community, here centred on 
the EU. Finally, the level of attraction involves the extent to which a 
neighbouring country – its elites and the public at large – is motivated 
to establish closer ties with the EU and eventually copy the EU 
governance model. 
The processes of externalization of EU rules in the EU’s 
neighbourhood are processes of standardization. Such processes have 
been theorized more generally in the literature on organizational fields 
and the dynamics of isomorphic change that they generate (see 
DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In order to understand such 
standardization processes in Ukraine and other countries of the EU's 
neighbourhood, it is important to pay attention to  local social 
structures (see Stinchcombe 1965) and their potential for mediating 
the impact and implementation of externally projected standards. 
Previously established administrative structures and cultures have an 
impact upon how and to what extent reforms and legislation are 
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implemented and enacted. Drawing inspiration from the work of Cohen 
and Levinthal (1990), we refer to this as ‘absorptive capacity’ of 
governance systems in the EU’s neighbouring countries.  A key point 
here is that established structures create conditions under which 
certain kinds of reforms and innovations are more readily accepted 
than others depending on the extent to which such reforms correspond 
with local social structures. In other words, there may be formal 
adoption of laws and regulations on the macro-level, but their actual 
impact translating into actual forms of adaptation in the neighbouring 
countries is mediated on the micro-level by the dynamics of the 
established social structures. Also, the process of adoption of EU 
standards may not always be a unified one where standards are 
adopted by neighbouring countries tout-court; it may evolve as a multi-
layered set of processes involving a range of standardization dynamics 
in different policy fields.  
In what follows, we explore processes of standardization in relation 
to EU rules in Ukraine along the four analytical dimensions proposed 
by Rieker. We do so by focusing on the three policy domains (energy 
cooperation, visa cooperation and trade) and by exploring micro-level 
dynamics of change based on information and data gathered locally by 
studying documents and conducting interviews. 
 Scope of Ukraine–EU agreements 
Currently, the key document regulating EU–Ukraine relations is the 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA)3. Since the PCA expired already in 2008, 
it is automatically renewed until the completion and successful 
ratification of Association Agreement, which was negotiated during the 
Paris Summit in September 2008, enters into force. To guide 
implementation of the Agreement, the ‘Association Agenda’, replaced 
the earlier EU – Ukraine Action Plan. It emphasizes values and 
universal principles: democracy, rule of law, human rights, market 
economy, etc., and focuses on supporting reforms in the Ukrainian 
economy, governance and in sector cooperation (Europa 2009). 
Compared to the Action Plan, the ‘Association Agenda’ is more specific 
in its priorities. In terms of the logics of economic and political 
association, its goals are considerably more integrationist than those 
set out in the Action Plan. It opens for Ukraine’s participation in certain 
EU programmes and agencies, and for implementation of sectoral 
divisions of the acquis. In general it aims to provide for a more 
accelerated approach in bringing about changes in Ukraine’s 
legislation and in increasing its convergence with EU standards. The 
AA compared to PCA has deepened the political association and 
economic integration significantly (Tyshchenko, 2011). Signing the 
Association Agreement would mean that Ukraine would commit to 
adopt and implement ‘about 95% of the EU’s existing trade- and 
economic-related acquis communautaire’ (Duleba et al. 2012: 73). 
Thus, successful adoption and implementation of Association 
Agreement could be considered as a third most complex and 
comprehensive agreement signed between the EU and a third country 
in terms of access to EU’s single market (ibid.: 73).  
The relevance of the AA lies not only in its more integrationist 
character, but also in the fact that it highlights bilateral responsibility 
for the fulfilment of its provisions. It stresses common evaluation of 
progress made, and the possibility of conducting separate evaluations 
on fulfilment of outlined tasks. There has also been an institutional 
impact, as a Joint Commission at the senior official level was created, 
responsible for monitoring progress. Further, the AA includes steps 
towards establishing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA), intended to open markets and deal with competiveness issues 
and other standards set by the EU in the area of trade. And finally, the 
                                                          
3  Text available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/ukraine/assoagreement/assoagreement-
2013_en.htm 
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AA highlights reforms in the sphere of justice, freedom and security, 
particularly concerning provisions on mobility.  
While the AA covers a complex set of issues, there are limitations 
due to its ambiguity, the absence of possible evaluation of political 
progress, and the lack of adequate information about the realization of 
priorities set for the political sphere (Tyshchenko et al. 2012). 
Moreover, no mention is made of any provisions concerning EU 
financial aid and assistance. Financial aid to Ukraine will continue to 
be available on the basis of general financial frameworks even if the 
rules and procedures in the AA are implemented only partially. There is 
no additional stimulus for reform here: instead, any changes will 
depend on the political will of the incumbent government. 
Scope of agreements: Energy 
So far, the only legally binding contract between the EU and Ukraine in 
energy sector is the Protocol of Ukraine’s Accession to Energy 
Community, which Ukraine joined in 2011. The Protocol stipulates the 
energy acquis that Ukraine is obliged to harmonize with, as well as a 
timetable for implementation. The significance of the Protocol lies in its 
contractual nature. Since becoming member of the Community, 
Ukraine was obliged to fulfil EU demands – which provides the EU with 
increased leverage in Ukraine.4 The Energy Community protocol is a 
highly advanced agreement, covering virtually all aspects of the sphere 
of energy. In fact, it is so complex that the Association Agreement has 
had to be rewritten as regards to the energy.5  
Along with the Protocol of Ukraine’s Accession to the Energy 
Community, Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in the 
field of energy represents another fundamental legal and institutional 
framework in the field of energy. Memorandum, signed already in 
2005, stipulates how both sides plan to organize their work in order to 
bring their energy markets closer together and establishes joint strategy 
in progressive integration of Ukrainian energy market with that of the 
EU. Operationalization of tasks outlined should be conducted 
according to road maps covering nuclear safety, integration of 
electricity and gas markets, security of energy supplies and the transit 
of hydrocarbons and to coal sector (Commission, 2012). 
Scope of agreements: Trade 
Cooperation in trade policy was institutionalized already in 1998 after 
ratification of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). 
Ratification had positive effects on developing EU–Ukraine bilateral 
                                                          
4  Interview I10, Kiev, 1 September 2013. 
5  Interview I4, Kiev, 26 September 2013. 
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relations not only in trade but also more generally in the economic and 
political spheres. Perhaps more importantly, PCA’s stipulations and 
regulations had helped Ukraine to fulfil WTO principles, eventually 
leading to its admission to the organization in 2008 (Duleba et al. 
2012). The progress in trade-related issues could be explained also by 
the involvement of actors keen to see the finalization of specific 
policies. The key actors here are the ‘oligarchs’ – highly influential 
business people who own central assets in the Ukrainian economy. 
Arguably, political developments in the country are often dependent on 
their actions and interests (Balmaceda 2008). It seems that supporting 
closer relations with the EU may be in the immediate interest of the 
oligarchs, but they also seek good relations with Russia so as not to 
lose access to its markets. According to Eurostat, Ukraine’s imports and 
exports to the EU are comparable in volume to its imports and exports 
to Russia (Eurostat 2011). Some analysts see Ukraine’s refusal to sign 
AA in Vilnius, after slightly increased convergence towards the EU, as 
confirming the continuation of Kiev’s ‘neo-Titoist’ game of oscilating 
between Brussels and Moscow (Popescu & Wilson 2009; Kobzová & 
Popescu 2011). Since economics and politics are closely intertwined, 
multi-vector economic policy leads to multi-vector foreign policy: so 
Ukraine’s government has focused on developing good relations with 
both the EU and Russia. After all, Russia has effective tools for 
damaging trade relations with Ukraine if it so decides, as shown by the 
trade spat in August 2013. Moscow unilaterally stopped all imports 
from Ukraine, intended as a first warning shot in order to prevent 
possible further Euro-integration attempts of Kiev and drive it closer to 
Moscow instead (Popescu. 2013). According to Ukraine’s Federation of 
Employers representing the interest of around 8, 500 companies 
producing some 70 per cent of Ukraine’s GDP, due to this decision, 
Ukraine was estimated to  incur losses of up to 2.5 billion USD in the 
second half of 2013 (FT 2013). Given the recent developments 
following civil unrest and the ousting of president Yanukovich from 
power in February 2014, the losses could be far greater. On February 
28, 2014, Ukraine’s economy and currency were plummeting. One 
estimate was that the country needed an immediate financial infusion 
of $ 4 billion and an additional more than $ 30 billion in aid to survive 
2014 and 2015.6 
The first chapter of the DCFTA with Ukraine aims to remove customs 
duties on imports and exports. The overwhelming majority of custom 
duties would be removed as soon as the Agreement enters into force: 
specifically, Ukraine will eliminate 99.1% and the EU 98.1% of duties 
in trade value (Commission 2013: 2). Moreover, the trade agreement 
envisages opening the EU single market to Ukrainian exporters 
                                                          
6  “Ukraine needs 4 billion in immediate help”, Reuters, 28.2.2014 (available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/27/uk-ukraine-crisis-eu-
idUKBREA1Q24220140227, accessed on Feb 28, 2014)  
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(however, it still provides tariff quotas for sensitive goods) more rapidly 
than opening the Ukrainian market to EU exporters. This would mean 
that Ukraine would have more time to adapt and harmonize all 
necessary trade regulations.7 Overall, the DCFTA aims at increasing 
transparency and legal certainty for EU investments in Ukraine. The 
agreement further envisages that Ukraine will adopt current EU 
legislation and comply with future legislation on public procurement: 
that would serve as a unique example of the integration of a non-EEA-
member into the EU’s single market. Also unprecedented is the trade-
related energy chapter in the DCFTA. Here the parties agree to let 
market prices prevail on domestic gas and electricity markets; further 
to conduct expedited dispute settlement procedures if the rule of non-
interrupting transit or not taking energy goods transit destined for 
other party is breached, to set up an independent regulator to ensure 
efficient functioning of the gas and electricity markets, and non-
discriminatory access to exploration and production of hydrocarbons 
(ibid.: 2–7).  
Scope of agreements: Visa policy 
The Action Plan for Visa Liberalization (VLAP) was granted to Ukraine 
in November 2010. It provides guidelines for setting up an EU–Ukraine 
agenda concerning reforms in the sphere of justice, freedom and 
security, formulated already as a part of the EU–Ukraine Action Plan in 
2002 and based on experience with road maps for countries in the 
Western Balkans since 2008 (see Tyshchenko 2012). The VLAP 
consists of four tailor-made blocks for each country: document security 
including biometrics, illegal immigration including readmission, 
public order and security, external relations and fundamental rights; 
with operationalization in two phases: creating overall policy 
framework and implementation. Significant progress has been made in 
all four blocks, particularly since the end of 2012. The legal framework 
has been modified substantially; however, the Commission has noted, 
the ‘anti-discrimination framework needs to be further strengthened to 
provide adequate legal protection against discrimination’ (Commission 
2013: 2).  
Along with the AA, the VLAP is one of the key elements creating a 
general impetus for changes in Ukrainian society, while also providing 
the EU with instruments for launching reforms. The EU aims to make its 
eastern border secure by engaging Ukraine in ‘consistent and 
comprehensive cooperation in areas of justice liberty and security’ 
(Sushko 2012:88). 
                                                          
7   Interview I4, Kiev, 2 October 2013. 
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Ukraine has already banned all visa requirements for EU citizens 
travelling to Ukraine and has expected the EU to do the same.8 In 
response, in June 2013 the EU amended the VLAP by agreeing on the 
facilitation of the issuance of visas. Since 2007, an agreement has been 
in place between the European Community and Ukraine on facilitating 
entry into the EU for certain groups of Ukrainians, on issuance of 
multiple-entry visas, and on lowering the fees or general waiver on the 
processing fee and issuance of visas, etc. (Eur-Lex 2007). Nevertheless, 
because most Ukrainian citizen are still obliged to obtain visas for 
travel into the EU, some observers have argued that the syndrome of 
building ‘Fortress Europe’ is deeply embedded in the EU. Ukrainian 
society suffers from this phenomenon, even though examples from 
previous EU enlargement rounds indicate that socialization and 
increasing people-to-people contact serve as powerful encouragements 
for further modernization, Europeanization and general speeding-up of 
reforms (Sushko et al. 2012; Shapovalova 2013). 
                                                          
8  Interview  I5, Kiev, 30 September 2013. 
 Level of adaptation 
The local social structure of governmental institutions in countries of 
the EU neighbourhood will have an impact upon these counties’ ability 
to reform along the lines set out in strategic documents agreed with the 
EU. In the case of Ukraine, the style of government and procedures 
through which the Soviet regime operated have remained strongly 
influential even after the regime change (Lewis 2003). This relates to a 
more general point about socialization in organizations. After years of 
service in a particular organization, individuals may become socialized 
and lose or modify their attitudes and behaviour (Selznick 1957; 
Egeberg 1999). ‘Institutionally embedded praxis is a ... common and 
important factor in institutional change … and, thus, deserves greater 
theoretical and empirical attention’ (Seo and Creed 2002: 244). As is 
the case in most post-Soviet countries, the Soviet legacy still persists in 
institutional memory and in Soviet-era practices. Such practices are 
challenged by the EU’s requirements for transparency, competition and 
control of corruption. Over time, state institutions have developed their 
own culture of informal practices, with reliance on informal networks 
or ‘telephone justice’ (Ledeneva 2011). The various EU requirements 
now challenge established ways of how things are done, in turn 
creating tension within state institutions. Here lies the main challenge 
in reforming the Ukrainian sistema.  
As it is evident from the EaP Index (2013), Ukraine’s interests are 
economically and politically driven, where it developed best economic 
and political ties, scoring in trade and economic integration (0.72) and 
in political dialogue (0.88) most of the points amongst 6 countries 
included in the EaP. Unfortunately, this does not project into the actual 
situation on the ground, when further progress on AA was halted 
because of single-handed decision of the President. This fact only 
strengthens our initial assumption that local structure is what really 
matters in Ukraine.  
Level of adaptation: Energy 
In the gas sector, Ukraine has shown eagerness in reorganizing 
subsidiary companies of NJSC Naftogaz, as set by the EU Directive 
2003/55/EC on the independence of the Ukrainian gas transmission 
system, and in carrying out reforms that stem from Ukraine’s Energy 
Community commitments (Europa.eu, 2013).9 The intention seems to 
                                                          
9  Seventh Joint EU-Ukraine Report, Implementation of the EU-Ukraine Memorandum 
of Understanding on Energy Cooperation during 2012. Available at: 
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be to show that Ukraine can be considered as reliable partner, one that 
fulfils the responsibilities required by the EU acquis. However, some 
work remains with regard to the EU Directive, the principle of non-
discrimination in particular. Guaranteeing fair competition in this field 
seems especially difficult, as creating additional competition may not 
be in the interest of the oligarchs who have connections to decision-
making procedures and can affect legislative processes (see also 
Balmaceda 2008). 
The rigidity of post-Soviet bureaucracy significantly affects the 
facilitation of further integration. Ukraine has implemented the first 
energy package and is currently working on second package, as yet 
fulfilled only partially. Most of the tasks have been delegated to 
medium-level civil servants and bureaucrats who lack the necessary 
skills and understanding of what is required to implement the acquis 
successfully.10 Roles of the ministries are widely dispersed, with no one 
knowing who is basically in charge. This problem affects most of the 
post-Soviet states – simply put, everyone manages and controls 
everyone, but no one is actually responsible for anything. The 
European departments in Ukraine’s line ministries lack resources, and 
their impact on implementation of EU standards is severely 
circumscribed.11  
A key provision for gradual liberalization of the Ukrainian gas and 
electricity market is the creation of an independent regulator in the 
country. In July 2010, the administration of then-President Viktor 
Yanukovich adopted the Law on the Principles of the Functioning of 
the Natural Gas Market and by Presidential Decree created the National 
Energy Regulation Commission of Ukraine (NERC) in November the 
following year. Because NERC was created by law and no such body 
had existed previously, it was made subordinate to the Ukrainian 
government. As a result, NERC is not in line with the EU acquis: it is not 
independent, but is in fact under the direct influence of the president 
(Duleba et al. 2012).  
Level of adaptation: Trade  
As Ukraine accounts for only 1% of EU export and Ukraine export to 
the EU oscillates around 30%, Ukraine will have to commit to 
substantial regulatory and institutional harmonization (Dabrowski and 
                                                                                                                                        
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/bilateral_cooperation/doc/ukraine/201
30225_mou_progress_report7_en.pdf 
10  Interview I1, Kiev, 24 September 2013; I10, Kiev, 1 October 2013.  
11  Based on the following interviews in Kiev, autumn 2013: I1, 24 September; I3, 25 
September; I4, 26 September; I7, 30 September; I9, 1 October; I10, Kiev, 1 
October; I13, 3 October; as well as internal memo from the European Commission 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, October 2013 
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Taran 2012). Thereafter, the impact of the DCFTA will have far-
reaching consequences for domestic producers in Ukraine.  
Several influential decrees have been issued by the President and 
the Parliament, showing willingness to proceed in further EU 
integration and modernization along the lines set out in agreements 
with the Union. An analysis made by the Ministry of Finance concludes 
that ‘important step toward the joint development of effective tools and 
methods to improve budget planning … was the continuation of the 
twinning project funded by the EU’ (Tyschenko 2012:83). This step was 
intended to ensure predictability and stability of budget policy, and as 
such represents an important element in creating a viable business 
environment that might European investors to the Ukrainian market 
(ibid.).  
Reforms in government administration have negatively influenced 
reforms in the field of technical regulation.12 The process of 
implementation has generally been slow or confusing. There is often no 
clear line of authority and responsibility between the bodies that 
approve new regulations and those that oversee implementation of 
existing regulations. What often happens is that new regulations 
become invalid and irrelevant because they contradict regulations 
already in place and implemented. The goal of continuing in reforming 
regulation standards and aligning them with the EU is indirectly also 
determined by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU). However, 
draft legislation proposed by the CMU often requires amending various 
other legislative acts. In turn, such draft legislation is rejected by the 
Parliament, leading to non-fulfilment of Ukraine’s obligations in 
relation to trade policy reform as set out in the AA agreed with the EU.  
In general, consistence and sequencing in introducing EU 
legislation are often random. In order introduce technical measures 
and standards regulating trade with the EU, Ukraine will also need to 
reform its administrative, legal and institutional framework. As the 
recent experience of Central European EU member-states indicates, 
while such a process is highly complex, it is certainly not impossible 
(Elster, Offe and Preuss 1998).  
Level of adaptation: Visa policy 
Liberalization of EU visa policy towards Ukraine is conditional on the 
implementation of anti-discrimination and anti-corruption laws, as 
agreed with the EU. Progress has been slow, with the main obstacles 
here being the reluctance of Ukrainian authorities to do so, as well as 
the alternative sets of rules promoted by some of the key local players.  
                                                          
12  Interview I10, Kiev, 1 October 2013; I7, Kiev, 30 September 2013. 
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The various attempts and declarations about fighting corruption 
have been largely formal (Tyshchenko 2012; Sushko et al. 2012). Bills 
drafted failed to be approved by the Parliament or were not accessible 
to general public, NGOs or to experts. The ‘Anti-corruption package’ 
adopted by the Parliament in 2009 entered into force in January 2010. 
However, in the course of 2010, the Parliament twice postponed 
enactment, and then abolished the whole package, only to adopt a new 
one, submitted by Yanukovich in late 2010 (Khmara 2012).  
In 2008, the government created a position for fighting corruption. 
This post was eliminated in 2011 as part of an administrative reform 
initiated by Yanukovich, even though the need for this agency follows 
directly from the VLAP, UN Convention against Corruption resolution 
55/61 (ratified by Ukraine) or in domestic Law of Ukraine ‘On the 
Principles of Preventing and Counteracting Corruption’ (Khmara 2012). 
Similarly, as was in case of the European coordination bureau 
responsible for European integration, the new government that came to 
power in 2010 dismissed anti-corruption documents and scrapped 
legislative efforts made by its predecessors. However, it should also be 
noted that the efforts of the previous government were minimal and 
lacked implementation (Sidenko 2013). In 2010, on Yanukovich’s 
initiative, the National Anti-corruption Committee was created within 
the Presidential Administration. Formally, it was intended to serve as a 
viable centre for producing and introducing anti-corruption reforms. 
However, some analysts dismiss it as merely a ‘platform for political 
declarations’ (Khmara 2012).  
Similarly, the only body responsible for issues regarding minority 
rights and anti-discrimination agenda – the State Committee for 
Nationalities and Religions – was eliminated as part of a broader 
administrative reform after Viktor Yanukovich came to power. 
According to a decree of the CMU, all functions of this body were 
delegated to a newly created department in the Ministry of Culture– but 
in this new department there is no organ or reference point for dealing 
with issues of combating discrimination (Belister 2012).  
In sum, the degree of adaptation in Ukraine has been mediated by 
local governance structures and traditions. Our research shows a 
pattern of derailing relatively new and relatively poorly 
institutionalized structures supporting EU-oriented adaptations, most 
notably after Yanukovich came to power in 2010. Several 
governmental structures created in order to support the 
implementation of AA-related legislative acts and practices were simply 
abolished in administrative reforms and/or replaced by Potemkin-like 
structures with formal mandates but no real substance or actual 
leverage for the transformation of governance. 
 
 Level of participation 
The shifts in the nature of the Ukrainian Constitution – from a 
presidential model established after independence was declared in the 
early 1990s towards an increasing role for the Parliament during the 
government that resulted from the Orange Revolution in 2004 and 
2005, and then back again towards a strong presidential system after 
Yanukovich came to power in 2010 – have clearly affected the 
institutional setup of the institutions that were supposed to guide 
reforms in the country.  
Across the political spectrum there has been consensus on 
integrating with the EU (only Communists traditionally opposed). 
Paradoxically, convergence with the EU (and its universal values, 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, etc.) was conducted 
simultaneously with strengthening of the presidential position within 
the Ukrainian constitutional system and increasing authoritarian 
tendencies of the then-president Kuchma (Wilson 2002). Kuchma’s 
regime (1994–2004) strengthened presidential control over the 
Parliament by systematic harassment of opposition, and manipulation 
of elections (Way 2005).  
The dominance of presidential powers under Kuchma stemmed from 
the 1996 Constitution, which declared Ukraine a presidential republic 
with strong executive powers granted to the President. Changed 
constitution altered power constellation also with regards to foreign 
policy. According to Article 106.2 of the Constitution, the president 
represents the state in international relations; administers the foreign 
policy activities of the State; conducts negotiations; and concludes 
international treaties of Ukraine. Article 85.5 specifies that authority of 
the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) comprises setting the principles of 
domestic and foreign policy (President of Ukraine 2011).13 Hence, 
foreign policy of Ukraine was thereafter subordinated to President’s 
decisions.  
Given the dominance of the president in foreign policy-making, the 
drive towards integration with the EU was relatively stable. Kuchma 
adopted the National Strategy on Integration to the European 
Community as a main framework that outlined Ukraine’s internal 
priorities in drawing closer to the EU. Slightly controversial at this 
point was that President Kuchma singlehandedly decided to adopt this 
                                                          
13  Text of the constitution is available at the presidential official website: 
http://www.president.gov.ua/en/content/chapter01.html 
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document without Parliamentary approval – which highlights the 
powerful position of the presidential office within Ukraine in that 
period (Wolczuk 2009). In 2003, the State Council for European and 
Euro-Atlantic Integration was created and tasked with coordinating its 
economic, political, security and legislative integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures. The Council was headed by the President (a further 
example of centralization of powers) and was supported by other 
legislative and executive branches, together with the Prime Minister 
and Speaker of the Parliament. Decisions of the Council decisions were 
binding. In 2005, with the new government in power following the 
Orange Revolution, the Council was abolished by the new president, 
Viktor Yushchenko.  
The ‘Orange’ government attempted to reorganize state 
administration in order to eliminate duplication of tasks. A new 
position of Vice Prime Minister for European Integration was created. 
The creation of such a high position within the government shows the 
determination of the Ukrainian authorities to have more than just 
economic cooperation with the EU.14 Changes in high-level positions 
could indicate that the new administration had a different vision of 
how European integration should be coordinated.  
In 2004, in the wake of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine faced 
political crisis caused by presidential elections. The Parliament 
adopted amendments to 1996 Constitution without the supervision of 
the Constitutional Court. This amended Constitution granted far wider 
authority to the Parliament and transformed Ukraine into 
parliamentary-presidential republic. The Prime Minister, chosen by the 
ruling coalition in Parliament, would be in charge of appointing 
cabinet ministers and also of executive policy-making. All these 
changes were made so as to declare the 2004 amendments to the 1996 
Constitution unconstitutional in a 2010 ruling of the Constitutional 
Court (Trochev 2011). This return to the 1996 Constitutional order in 
2010 had impacts on the re-organization of state’s institutional 
apparatus dealing with Euro-integration and strengthened the role of 
the President.  
This brief overview indicates that Ukraine is still searching for an 
institutional setup that could adequately address EU requirements. The 
report of the European Commission (2013) Capacity and Needs 
Assessment Report in the Area of Association Agreement 
Implementation, notes that despite EU technical assistance, ‘policy co-
                                                          
14  Unfortunately, due to dispersed roles of ministries in questions of European 
integration, this office was from the outset without a portfolio. Nevertheless, 
Ukraine managed to achieve significant progress in deepening of democratic norms 
and human rights (EU, ENPI 2013). 
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ordination meetings on senior civil servants level (Deputy Ministers) 
and ministers level have mainly been based on urgent policy needs’; 
further, that implementation of Institutional Reform Plan (IRP) suffers 
because of ‘insufficient experience’ of staff policy process related to 
coordination of adoption of the IRP, ‘limited internal staff resources’ or 
‘insufficient staff knowledge in the areas relevant to implementation of 
the future AA’ (Commission 2013: 5–7). Hence, the level of 
participation, as defined in our analytical framework here, is severely 
restricted by structural inconsistencies. However, it should be noted 
that various attempts by actors in the Ukrainian government seeking to 
develop governance solutions that would enable the country to transfer 
and adopt EU rules efficiently can also be seen as a form of 
participation, or at least creating structural conditions for participation 
in the EU’s political order. Evidence for this assumption confirms the 
fact that Ukraine scored only 0.43 in institutional arrangements for 
European integration in EaP Index (2013), being only third best 
country among the EaP countries. Moldova and Armenia scored 0.73 
and 0. 57 respectively.  
Level of participation: Energy  
Ukraine’s participation in EU policies in the sphere of energy has been 
a challenge. There are several obstacles when it comes to 
implementation of energy packages. As an expert on energy issues said 
during one of our interviews, despite timetables in the energy sector 
‘Ukraine lacks long term planning and sequencing of compliance’.15 A 
further issue is interdependence of EU legislation, in the sense that 
accomplishments in implementing EU legislation in one sector usually 
have positive effects in driving implementation in other sectors.16 The 
flip-side of this is that slow progress in one sector can have negative 
effects or generate inconsistencies in other sectors. For instance, the EU 
requires increased competition in the energy market. But achieving this 
will require competitive pricing, which in turn requires an independent 
regulator.17 Hence, there are often side-requirements that must be 
implemented prior to adopting the actual EU legislation – but EU does 
not provide recommendations as to these. Further, compliance with EU 
standards may decrease public support for incumbents, because 
conducting reforms and modernization necessitates the establishment 
of various technical and regulation measures. This requires additional 
financial capital from the public budget, which would be negatively 
reflected in its balance of expenditures. Since there are few exit 
strategies for incumbents, the primary goal of most of them is to hold 
on to their positions as long as possible.  
                                                          
15  Interview I4, Kiev, 26 September 2013. 
16  Interview I12, Kiev, 3 October 2013. 
17  Interview I13, Kiev, 3 October 2013. 
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An important and cross-cutting problem concerns public finance 
management:  the level of corruption and interconnectedness of 
oligarchs and Ukrainian politicians. After Yanukovich assumed office, 
the government started to review the 2006 Energy Strategy, because of 
recession in 2008/2009 and the Russia–Ukraine gas dispute.18 In 
2012, the Foundation for Effective Governance, established by oligarch 
and ex-MP of Party of Regions Rinat Achmetov, proposed the draft of a 
new energy strategy. When the public and NGOs heard of this, they 
became active and demanded an explanation from the government, but 
without any success. Even today it is still unclear what the official 
Ukrainian Energy Strategy actually looks like and what is stated in it.19 
Hence, it is also unclear how and on what premises Ukraine 
participates in the EU’s energy policy initiatives. 
Lack of financial and personnel resources, lack of cooperation 
mechanisms and lack of insight into key strategic documents in 
Ukraine all lead to unfortunate situations that raise questions about the 
country’s readiness and seriousness as regards participating in deeper 
cooperation with the EU. In one of the meetings of Energy Community, 
the Ukrainian side failed to send its representative, claiming it had no 
translator available. Here, however, the EU was so keen to meet with 
the Ukrainian side that it offered to provide a translator. A further 
example of the paucity of resources was a situation when the Head of 
Energy Secretariat of the Energy Community visited Ukraine to meet 
with the Minister of Energy. Unfortunately there must have been ‘some 
problem with experts on EU–Ukraine energy issues, so basically 
Ukraine was unprepared for this meeting and failed to meet the Head of 
Energy Secretariat’, as one interviewee explained.20 At present, the 
Ministry of Economy employs some five or six officials with a good 
command of English who are truly familiar with the Association 
Agreement. At least they know what specific changes have to be made 
in domestic legislative in order to implement the EU requirements 
successfully.21  
In sum, our findings show that there are limited personnel and 
financial resources in Ukraine devoted to forging closer forms of 
structured cooperation on energy issues with the EU. This in turns 
means that the level of Ukraine’s participation in the EU’s security 
community is severely limited in the energy sector. 
                                                          
18  http://ua-energy.org/post/34829 
19  Interview I10, Kiev, 1 October 2013  
20  Interview I4, Kiev, 26 September 2013. 
21  Interview I10, Kiev, 1 October 2013. 
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Level of participation: Trade  
The implementation of economic priorities set out in the AA has shown 
limited progress in recent years. Financial support provided by the EU 
is crucial for motivating the Ukrainian authorities to adopt the key legal 
instruments needed for implementation of the requisite legal and 
institutional provisions. Equally important is the know-how provided 
by European experts who work to socialize Ukrainian colleagues by 
providing them with possibilities for learning by doing and by teaching 
through twinning projects. As one interviewee put it: ‘funds are only 
half of the way if you do not know how to do it’.22  
Despite structural difficulties in implementing reforms, the EU’s 
export to Ukraine increased five-fold between 2000 and 2008, from 
€5.5 billion to €25.1 billion. The financial crisis apparently affected 
economic cooperation, as exports from the EU to Ukraine were almost 
halved in 2009, down €13.9 billion. However, the figure rose to €17.4 
billion in 2010 (Eurostat 2011). Further, Ukrainian exports to the EU 
countries increased by 92 per cent in the period 2009–2012 
(Commission, DG Trade 2012), whereas its export to CIS countries 
showed a 87 per cent increase in the same period (Ukrstat.org 2013). If 
this dynamic continues and the current restrictions and various quotas 
on exporting to the EU are lifted, then there is a fair chance that with 
gradual integration into the EU, the main export partner for Ukraine 
would be the EU.  
However, also here, Russia is an important factor that cannot be 
ignored. According to a recent WTO report (WTO 2013), Russian 
imports account to almost one third of all imports (32.4 per cent) with 
the EU close behind (30.5 per cent). Further confirmation of Russia’s 
importance for the Ukrainian economy is the fact that 25.7 per cent of 
all Ukrainian exports are destined for the Russian Federation, followed 
by the EU with 24.9 per cent. Thus we see that Ukrainian participation 
in the EU market has been on the increase but this has been paralleled 
by similar developments in relation to Russia. 
Level of participation: Visa policy 
The nature of the visa regime regulating access of Ukrainians to the 
political and economic space of the EU is of crucial importance. 
Basically, the current visa regime is a major hindrance to intensifying 
the level of participation. Conditions for liberalization of the visa 
regime include implementation of anti-discrimination legislation. As 
some analysts argue, massive Russian propaganda was one reason why 
Ukraine failed to implement such laws.23 In the bill that forms part of 
Ukraine's commitments under the VLAP, the provision on 
                                                          
22  Interview I11, Kiev, 2 October 2013. 
23  Interview I 12, Kiev 3 October 2013. 
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discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in employment 
relations has become a highly divisive issue in society (Belister 2012). 
The current Ukrainian institutional system, judicial and administrative 
practices do not provide for effective protection against discrimination 
(ibid.). The draft law was presented on the websites of the Ministry of 
Justice, for open debate. In a report on this debate, the Ministry 
stressed the concerns and active resistance of religious organizations, 
particularly the Orthodox Church, to the draft. According to the 
Ministry, the main concern of these organizations focused on clauses 
concerning the protection of sexual minorities, and that the presented 
draft was perceived as a ‘“propaganda of homosexuality”, undermining 
the moral and ethical foundation of society and even “bringing 
genocide to Ukrainians”’(ibid.: 42). Questions can be raised as to what 
extent various actors, perhaps including the Russian government, may 
have played a role in propagandistic efforts that skilfully exploited the 
sensitivities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church here.  
The main reasons for stagnation in the field of visa issues could 
relate to lack of interest on the part of Ukrainian politicians. Since there 
is already a visa facilitation agreement that enables them to travel 
without queuing at EU member-state embassies, they lack the sense of 
responsibility and urgency to provide the same rights to the rest of the 
populace.24 Ukraine’s participation in the EU’s security community in 
the sphere of visa-free travel has been low and selective, applied to 
only a few select politicians and businesspeople:  the vast majority of 
ordinary citizens must undergo lengthy and costly visa application and 
approval procedures. 
In fact, as a recent study points out (Shapovalova 2013), there are 
few persuasive arguments why visas for Ukrainians could not be 
abolished. Only 2 percent of all illegal border crossings to the EU were 
reported from its Eastern border; moreover, the refusal rate (normally 
an indicator of the threat of illegal migration) for Ukrainians is 3.3 per 
cent, a level considered close to ‘safe’ in an EU perspective 
(Shapovalova 2013:3).25  
                                                          
24  Interview I 5, Kiev, 30 September 2013 
25 The same study shows that the refusal rate for Moldova was almost two times higher 
(6.5 % in 2012). Yet it did not prevent the EU following the same policies as with 
Ukraine; eventually a visa-free regime will be initiated in July 2014. 
 Level of attraction 
There are mixed perceptions about Ukraine’s involvement in the ENP 
and EaP. Ukrainian officials perceived these initiatives as a demotion 
and underestimation of the country’s market potential and its 
geopolitical importance26. Including Ukraine in the ENP framework 
thwarted Kiev’s aspirations of prospective EU membership, since none 
of the ENP countries received any membership promises. While 
Ukraine insisted on a more privileged partnership cooperation,27 the 
launch of the EaP in 2009 fell far below Ukrainian expectations since it 
also included countries that openly (Belarus) or in a hidden way 
(Armenia until recently) had refused to deepen their economic and 
political ties with the EU. In addition, the lack of a clear vision of EU 
membership was also humiliating since EU membership, for many, was 
associated with being civilized and modern (Batt 2003).  
The EU has traditionally been perceived as a major soft-power player 
and a highly attractive global entity (Leonard 2005). However, the 
European soft power has been challenged by Russia in many of the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership. As Popescu and Wilson (2009) 
point out, while the EU maintains a ‘Schengen wall’ with strict 
regulations, Russia has had a visa-free policy as well as an open labour 
market toward these same countries. Another interesting factor is that 
while companies from the EU have been investing in small and medium 
sized companies, such as design furniture stores and breweries, Russia 
has been actively investing in energy companies and other heavy 
industry. Since such investments both create job opportunities for the 
Ukranians and provide Russia with the power to directly decrease oil 
and gas prices, it has the potential of making Russia more attractive in 
relation to broad strata of the Ukrainian population. Finally, while the 
EU has required adaptation to EU regulations without being able to 
provide a clear promise of membership, Russia has used a convincing 
rhetoric of brotherhood through Russian media, which is  easily 
accessable in Ukraine.  
However opinion polls conducted in Ukraine over the past ten years 
shows an increasing support for establishing closer ties with the EU. 
According to Razumkov centre sociological poll28 from 2002 
concerning which foreign policy direction should be a priority for 
                                                          
26  Interviews I1–I13, conducted in Kiev between 24 September and 3 October 2013. 
27  Interviews conducted in Kiev, autumn 2013: I1, 24 September; I2, 25 September; 
I7, 30 September; I9, 1 October. 
28  Available at: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=305 
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Ukraine, 31.4 per cent answered, the EU countries. In late 2012 this 
support had increased to 40.8 per cent. On the other hand, support for 
Russia has only had a moderate increase (less than 4 per cent) in the 
same period of time (from 31.6 to 35.3 per cent). Interestingly enough, 
support for EU accession has decreased in same period of time from 
65.1 per cent to 48.4 per cent.29 
These results could be explained by a more active policy from Russia 
towards Ukraine. Since 2010, the Russian pressure to draw Ukraine 
closer to Moscow’s orbit has intensified (Sidonenko 2013). This has 
been facilitated by increases in Russian revenues from energy exports, 
paralleled with a weakening of the EU due to the financial and political 
crisis in the Eurozone. As a result, the EU has turned increasingly 
inward, focusing its efforts on deepening rather than on widening.  
Russia, as a competing field of standardization, has served to 
hamper Ukraine in absorbing new EU practices, rules and standards. 
With established historical legacies, no requirements of modernization, 
the vision of swift financial support, Moscow’s attempts to re-integrate 
the post-Soviet region. These are in fact the greatest obstacles for the 
EU. The absorptive capacity of Ukraine’s state institutions has 
remained inadequate and embedded in post-Soviet practices in society. 
The pragmatic calculations of the elites affect any attempts at 
modernization and reform. By contrast, the organizational field of 
Russian governance is already deeply embedded in Ukrainian society, 
requiring no further adjustment to the existing sistema.  
Despite these developments and the soft-power shortcomings in 
Brussels’ approach towards Ukraine, the EU is still perceived as an 
attractive partner and an essential part of the country’s future in most 
spheres.30 The recent large-scale public unrest and pro-EU sentiments 
sweeping the streets of Kiev and other cities in Ukraine, after 
Yanukovich refused to sign the AA and ex-prime minister Azarov halted 
all Ukrainian integration attempts, seem to indicate that the EU is not 
only an economic but indeed also a civilizational choice for large 
segments of Ukrainian society.  
                                                          
29  Available at: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=387. 
30  Interviews I1–I13, conducted in Kiev between 24 September and 3 October 2013. 
 Conclusions 
Our analysis has shown a pattern of increasing interaction between the 
EU and Ukraine in the key policy fields of energy, trade and visa 
regulations in terms of scope of agreements, level of adaptation and 
level of participation. There are two main findings here. First, the 
externalization of EU rules and their adoption in Ukraine has different 
dynamics in different policy fields. While, for instance, the field of 
trade policy has seen a highly dynamic development, with increases in 
the level of mutual exchange, the field of visa policy has remained 
relatively stagnant. Second, the increasing complexity and density of 
interactions and rule transfer have been unfolding in a context of 
unreformed public administration still imbued with a culture of the 
Soviet sistema, vested interests of business groups, unclear authority 
relations, loose couplings between regulations and their actual 
application, and frequent and often inconsistent reform processes. 
Effective externalization of EU rules in relation to Ukraine will depend 
on a parallel process of public administration reforms and the 
development of structures and processes of good governance in the 
country. In the transition period, local structures and traditions 
mediate effects of EU rules; and implementation is slow and often 
inconsistent. Moreover, unlike many other countries of the EU 
neighbourhood (most notably those in the South), Ukraine is under 
pressure from an alternative source of governance standards: Russia. 
Here the models can draw on decades of firmly-established economic 
and cultural ties, and it is not clear that the EU’s model of governance 
and the goods its governance provides are more attractive to 
Ukrainians than the governance models and goods that could be 
provided by maintaining close ties with Russia.  
Given the complexities of the social structure and absorptive 
capacity of the Ukrainian governance system and the competing 
sources of standardization emanating from the EU and from Russia, the 
ENP as a tool for stabilizing the EU’s external borders seems, 
paradoxically, to have a destabilizing effect in the short to medium 
term. The new practices and rules promoted by the EU are challenging 
established ways of governing in Ukraine. As shown by the wave of 
wide-ranging civic unrest at the time of this writing, the Ukrainian 
population seems ready for profound changes in how the country is 
governed. This may provide the basis for more radical forms of 
transformation of Ukraine’s governance structures and possibly space 
for establishing more efficient mechanisms that can bring the country 
closer to the EU. Again, the question is to what extent the EU forms of 
governance are more attractive than other kinds of governance models 
and institutions. Here, more unambiguous prospects of membership for 
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Ukraine from the EU’s side may be decisive in making the European 
offer a more attractive one.  
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